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Conceptions of Humor: Lakota
(Sioux), Koestlerian, and
Computational
Benjamin Grant Purzycki
Abstract: The Lakota (Sioux) sacred clowns (heyoka) of traditional
religious practice offer a glimpse of the clown phenomenon found in
many of the world's indigenous traditions. By illustrating the unified
Lakota and Western conceptions of humor, the logic of how particular
entities of the natural environment are understood as relatives
according to Lakota thought is brought to light in hopes of introducing
the idea that such insights were not only statements or observations
about the external, physical world, but also about the internal or
mental world.

Introduction and Prefatory Remarks
Any investigation into any non-Western social paradigm (or
"culture") will be fraught with difficulties if the investigator is too
hasty by immediately "fragmenting" the body of knowledge held under
scrutiny according to his or her own intellectual tradition's dicta
(Battiste & Youngblood Henderson 2000; Deloria Jr. 1979; Gayton this
volume). It is part of this author's intention to attempt to understand
and convey one related sliver of a particular tradition of the Plains. It
should be understood that this glimpse is vastly incomplete and truly
lies within a much broader context and network of Lakota thought. A
result of this tendency, relegating or equating a specific population's
thought to the category of religion is not accurate if the tradition under
scrutiny does not separate the two.
Moreover, it would be erroneous to claim that the following
investigation probes "religion", rather, if anything, it is an examination
of a portion of a culture as it is a way in which a people view a number
of phenomena (hence "thought"). The Lakota (Sioux) tradition does
not, nor does their lexicon reflect such a qualitative distinction between
"religion", "thought", or "social paradigm". Take, for instance, the
observation that the nature of the experience of humor (i.e. laughter)
resembles lightning is not a "religious" observation, per se. Rather, it is
and can be understood in a completely secular manner. In one sense,
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then, it is the author's intentions to elevate-at the very least-this
small portion of Lakota thought to one of philosophy, rather than
religious, as its complexity and subtleties merits philosophical scrutiny,
rather than any investment of faith. The problem inherent in doing this,
of course, is the fact that some may not find what more or less amounts
to a secularization of a particular tradition entirely appropriate either.
While laughter is seen as sacred among the Lakota, it is my intention to
make observations and report them, rather than make claims without
the qualification or aptitude of what determining what precisely
"sacred" is. Moreover, by elevating "religion" to the status of
philosophy, it makes it available to serious, critical analysis.
The following discussion, then, is an attempt to look at one
particular cluster of concepts and their relationships, which is discussed
by both Lakota and Koestler in surprisingly similar terms followed by a
brief sketch of what a computational theory of humor might look like
based on this unified starting point. While "culture" and "humor" are
equally elusive, there are differences. The problem with talking about
"culture" is that while it is difficult to pin down precisely what it is,
whatever one says will probably be at least a little correct because it is
so big. The problem with talking about humor is that it is so small.
"Social paradigm" is preferred as the discussion is primarily on the
shared information that a particular social body shares and uses to view
the world. That said, at the very least, the concluding sketch of a
computational theory was highly influenced by Lakota and Koestlerian
philosophy alike.
Humor
As a starting point for discussion, one of the key components
of heyoka behavior is humor and their employment thereof. As much
of the heyoka's behavior is typically rendered humorous, investigating
the logic of how humor generally works as informed by both Lakota
traditional knowledge and the insights provided by Western
philosophers is important in order to understand the relationships
between the symbolic incorporations of the (rest of the) physical
environment and the associations or relationships that are made
between them. However, an initial discussion of previous investigation
into the phenomenon of humor from the Western intellectual tradition
is in order.
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Figure 1. The Bissociative Shock (Koestler 1964: 35)
Much has been written on the psychology of humor since
Plato, and most renowned philosophers touched upon the topic and
some point. In his Critique of Judgment, Kant notes that humor
"belongs to originality of mind .. Humour, in a good sense, means the
talent for being able to put oneself at will into a certain frame of mind
in which everything is estimated on lines that go quite off the beaten
track, (a topsy-turvy view of things,) and yet on lines that follow
certain principles, rational in the case of such a mental temperament"
(Kant 1928: 203). Furthering the thesis, Arthur Koestler notes that
"Humour depends primarily on its surprise effect: the bisociative
shock. To cause surprise the humorist must have a modicum of
originality-the ability to break away from the stereotyped routines of
thought" (Koestler 1967: 91). Koestler defines "bisociative" as the
dual-association with "routine skills of thinking" and "the creative act"
(Fig. 1).
Koestler's model depicts "the perceiving of a situation or
idea, L, in two self-conSistent but habitually incompatible frames of
reference, M J and M2 ••• The event L, in which the two intersect, is made
to vibrate simultaneously on two different wavelengths, as it were.
While this unusual situation lasts, L is not merely linked to one
associate context, but bisociated with two" (35). Take, for instance,
someone belching loudly during a moment of prayer at a Christian
mass. The bisociative shock occurs when one context (the sanctity and
silence of prayer) suddenly clashes with another (the general rudeness
of eructation). In this case, however, few would find it very humorous.
Humor, then, must contain a bisociative shock, but must be cognitively
"coded positively" rather than negatively (for further discussion, see
below). In this case, then, Koestler's discussion of the relationship
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between creativity and humor would only be applicable if the belching
individual erupted on purpose. Note Koestler's zigzagged illustration
of the clash of the two frames.
Humor, then, being "originality of mind" is the meeting place
between two areas of thought. Pinker (1997), in reference to Koestler's
observations, explains this quite well:
Humor ... begins with a train of thought in one frame of reference that
bumps up against an anomaly: an event or statement that makes no
sense in the context of what has come before. The anomaly can be
resolved by shifting to a different frame of reference, one in which the
event does makes [sic] sense. And within that frame, someone's
dignity has been downgraded (549).
The "downgraded dignity" that Pinker refers to will be investigated
below with respect to the Lakota clowns. What should be kept in mind,
however, is the fact that this downgrading is one of the jUnctions or an
example or type of humor.
Kant defines laughter-the behavioral or external expression
of humor-on the other hand as "an affection arising from a
[cognitive1y based] strained expectation being suddenly reduced to
nothing" (Kant 1928: 199). What makes a joke funny is an unexpected
punch-line, slapstick humor is surprising, and linguistic humor is an
employment of an inappropriate word/style for describing something.
What makes humor emotional is the pleasant psychological state that
ensues. In sum, humor is equal parts surprise and happiness. However,
as mentioned above, sometimes what is intended to be humorous can
be taken as an affront, in radical opposition to "happiness" (see below).
Some attempts at humor are rendered inappropriate for two primary
reasons: the joke is judged as poor taste both qualitatively (e.g. a dirty
joke) and temporally (e.g. "not the right time for that").
At its core-but stripped of its emotional component-humor
is a violation of our intuitions; what we judge to be funny results in the
"beaten track" or "normalcy" of the medium (e.g. narrative, someone
walking, etc.) being shocked off of the track suddenly (e.g. punch line,
slipping on a banana peel)-with the extra feature of being "coded"
positively by whomever witnesses the act or idea (see below for further
discussion). Miller (2000) notes that "Comedy depends on showing
how many ways something can go wrong-on violating expectations,
not solving problems" (415). The term "intuitions" is preferable
because "expectations" are quite specific and conclusive whereas
intuition reflects an active process, rather than a representation. A
simple joke, typically, is set up in a baiting fashion and the punch line
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contains an element of surprise. Slapstick humor, on the other hand, is
employed in a similar fashion; the "punch-line" in this case being a
physical surprise of the body doing something typically uncomfortable
(e.g. The Three Stooges). Veatch (1998) argues that humor is a
"subjective moral violation" because it "violates a principle about
which the perceiver believes, 'This is the way things should be"'. While
is many (or even most) cases, this would is correct, the fact that many
cases of, take say, political humor makes fun of those in high status.
For those who dislike the target of the joke, the "moral principle"
involved is not violated, but rather maintained. Nevertheless, the key
component to Veatch's theory of humor is the fact that we have to be
able to code such violations positively, or render the violation "alright"
(Taylor 2004: 22).
For such examples, we may consider them "representations"
in order to get to the bottom of the present investigation. For all intents
and purposes, "representation" may be used synonymously with "idea"
or "occurrence"; it is a basic unit of analysis of information to which
one may be exposed. Again, when we are confronted with a
representation of something intended to be humorous (assuming we
"get it"), sometimes the incoming information is decidedly unfunny or
objectionable. Such is the case of the Lakota clowns.

Heyoka
Heyokas are the sacred clowns or contraries among the Sioux.
These figures are, according to Lewis, "loosely organized [and] at least
partly [a] secret society ... [and] by systematically breaking the customs
and prohibitions of the community the contrary achieves a personal
mysteriousness that translates into the magical and the sacred." (Lewis
1992: 140) It must be noted that this "breaking the customs" and
violating taboos are sanctioned only insofar as the individual that
actually breaks the custom is indeed a heyoka, even though some, as
revealed below, still find them objectionable. In other words, these
institutionalized rebels, through their actual breaking of the rules, are
enforcers and perpetuators of the holy-in order for the clowns to
fulfill their role or obligations as heyoka, they break the rules.
The heyoka, according to John Fire Lame Deer, "is an upsidedown, backward-forward, yes-and-no-man, a contrary wise ... Being a
clown brings you honor, but also shame" (Lame Deer & Erdoes 1972:
236). When a contrary is asked a question, he wili answer in opposites,
they have been known to wear next to nothing in cold weather and wear
far too much in hot weather, and they've been known to ride horses
backwards in battles. Such is the life of a contrary. Traditionally,
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heyokas tended to dress in shabby clothes; some were reported to
simply wear burlap sacks with eyeholes cut out in them. Masks the
clowns sometimes wore/wear have exaggerated phallic noses, and their
actions are typically full of sexual innuendo and flat-out mock
performance of sexual acts. They were known to have lived in tipis
with the tarps or skins on the inside with the frame exposed to the
elements.
On the one hand, Feraca (1998) notes that "Lakotas do not
consider clowns an especially amusing or comical group. In fact, their
very presence constitutes a potential danger, particularly at religious
functions" (50). Such "potential dangers" range from causing poor
weather, a reversaUnullification of a particular rite, etc. On the other,
as an insider, Lame Deer observes that "the no-account people and
winos make fun of the heyokas, but the wise old people know that the
clowns ... protect the people from lightning and storms and that his
capers, which make people laugh, are holy. Laughter-that is
something very sacred" (Lame Deer & Erdoes 1972: 237). Their
receptions among the Sioux are obviously mixed, yet their impact on
individuals and social gatherings alike, is unquestionable. On a
practical level, the clown acts as a catalyst to bring psychological and
emotional balance to others. Henry Crow Dog explains that
White people depict us in their books and movies as stony-faced folks
with the comers of our mouths turned down, always looking grim. But
we are not like that. Among ourselves we joke and laugh. With all that
suffering and poverty our people can survive only by laughing at
misfortune. That's why we have the sacred clown, heyoka ... he makes
us laugh through our tears (Crow Dog & Erdoes 1995: 60).
Black Elk mused that "When people are already in despair,
maybe the laughing face is better for them; and when they feel too good
and are too sure of being safe, maybe the weeping face is better for
them to see. And so I think that is what the heyoka ceremony is for"
(Neihardt 2000: 145). This balance is maintained by the clowns
themselves, who in turn act as an emotional equalizer for the people;
through his "extreme" acts, the clown moderates the excesses of others.
One formally becomes a contrary when he (or she, rarely)
dreams of the Thunderbirds (Wakinyan) or one of their underlings'
representations ranging from dragonflies, white animals such as horses,
dogs, snowbirds, frogs, and hailstorms (Walker 1991: 10 1). According
to Thomas Tyon, "the Wakinyan often command the man who dreams
of them to do certain things" which are typically quite embarrassing for
the initiate. If one fails to do whatever they are instructed to do by the
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Thunderbirds (or lieutenants), "the Wakinyan will surely kill them" by
lightning strike (155-156). In sum, the Thunderbirds will "gift" the
dreamer with a scenario that he must act out in public-in some cases,
it is claimed that the conditions and people that are in the dream are
also revealed making the act quite specific in terms of timing.
According to Lame Deer, "A heyoka, if he follows his dream
to the letter, has to dress up as he saw himself in his vision". Such
instructions in the dreams, according to written accounts, are to be
carried out in everyday life. While there are specific behaviors a
heyoka must fulfill, being a clown is more of a lifestyle, for lack of a
better word; one does not become a clown only during specific times,
but rather are perpetually in a state of behaving in opposites and
making others laugh. In the case of the highly organized rites of the
Sioux, the clowns typically cause mass disruption by chastising rite
participants and the audience in their usual manner. However, in the
clowns' efforts to bridge the sacred and quotidian, "sacred" and highly
individualized rites are performed as almost daily prescriptions, rather
than an elaborate ritual. For instance, Lame Deer himself, in
accordance to his dream, became a winkte or cross-dresser by the name
of "Alice Jitterbug" who performed as a rodeo clown. Though not
what one would immediately assume to be a "religious act", provoking
laughter in a large audience under the prescription of the Thunderbirds,
is, however. There is, however, a specific clown ceremony (heyoka
kaga) for inductees.
There are two clear variations of the heyoka kaga. Holy
Dance, an Oglala, describes the variations as a highly formalized rite
which may be due to the initiate's being a woman. After the obligatory
inipi (sweatlodge purification), eight heyokas enter a tipi to get dressed
in their respective regalia, while the clowns conducting the ceremony
remain in the initi (actual lodge). Two of the eight clowns leave the
first tipi, only to walk a few yards to a second tipi, where they will
remain singing for the rest of the ritual. More highly organized
dancing, singing, and prayer occur, until a pot of boiling water with a
dog in it is ready. Prior to this, the dog must be killed immediately to
reflect the sudden nature of lightning (DeMallie 1984: 232). The
initiate plunges her hands into the pot, without scalding, and pulls the
dog's head out. Heyoka tapejuta, or "clown medicine" (Malvastrum
coccineum), prevents the clowns from getting scalded. Malvastrum
coccineum is commonly known as red false mallow or prairie mallow.
It is a grey "moss root" (Buechel & Manhart 2002: 83). It is chewed up
and spread over the hands and arms in order to tolerate the boiling
water, although according to the Sioux, it is only functional on a true
heyoka. Holy Dance states that if "anyone in the crowd belong[s] to
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that [heyoka] organization, they will rush toward her taking the dog
head, which is very hot." They all return to the first tipi, concluding the
ceremony (Lewis 1992: 145).
Some sources claim that the vision of the heyoka dictates how
long one must serve as a clown, while others indicated there is a level
of personal choice involved. Either way, a ceremony is held to
"formalize" the heyoka's transition from being a clown to becoming
either a different sort of practitioner or reintroduced to "normal" life.
As in the heyoka kaga, a sacred dog is boiled and the clown ending his
"term" plunges his hands into the boiling water and pulls the dog's
head out, tossing it to someone who is not a heyoka. According to
Lame Deer, the clown runs, "guided ... by the spirit, by what he has
dreamed, to whom to give this dog's head. He will give it to a certain
sick man or woman [who] quickly [throws] it to another man." Nonclowns toss the head around, getting scalded, while the other clowns
gather the rest of the dog meat with their bare hands. The meat then is
distributed to the "poor and the sick. [The clown's] dreams told them
whom to give it to. That's a good medicine" (Lame Deer & Erdoes
1972: 245). This version is much less structured and formal than the
initiation into "heyokism".
The logic of performing the heyoka kaga and the rite which
terminates one's service as a contrary is a perfect reflection of the
heyoka's nature. One enters, formally through the rite, his or her
"clownship" in order to serve the Wakinyan. When one's term is nearly
complete, they perform (still as clowns) the heyoka kaga once again.
Obviously, the opposite of ending one's service as a contrary would be
beginning one's service, hence the near exactitude of rites-the only
difference being the level of formalization. This may, however, simply
be due to individual variation in ritual practice.
Being contraries, the clowns must perform certain aspects of
various ceremonies backwards, or simply act ridiculously during sacred
rites. The actual heyoka ceremony itself illustrates the nature of these
clowns. John Plant notes that, in conjunction with the contrariness of
the heyoka, "Die Musik fUr die Zeremonie [ist] entweder dumpf oder
unharmonisch. Man konnte sie als 'verkehrte Musik' bezeichnen."
How is this "reverse" or anti-music possible? He observes that "Eine
gedampfte Trommelmusik wurde auch erreict, indem man mit StOcken
aif ein am Boden aufgespanntes Fell schlug" (Plant 1994: 95).1
As the Wakinyan govern the clowns, there are a number of
common threads throughout the literature including a number of
associations that are made between the clowns, the theme of
opposites/dichotomies, the Thunderbirds, humor, shock, creativity,
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procreation, and specific animals. The question begs: why are these
associations made and/or observed?
Non-Human Elements of the Environment

As previously mentioned, dreaming of lightning is a sure sign
of one's "assignment" of being a heyoka. Depictions of lightning look
like a single bolt, which forks into two (sometimes feathered) branches
(Fig. 2). Lame Deer notes that the forked lightning bolt represents the
dualistic nature of the clowns, as the power of the Thunderbirds "is the
power of the hot and the cold clashing way above the clouds ... 1t is
good and bad" (Lame Deer & Erdoes 1972: 240).

Figure 2. Wakinyan (Illustration
Adapted from Lame Deer & Erdoes, 1972: 240).
Clearly, the occurrence of lightning and thunder is startling, but we do
not associate the nature of lightning to be humorous per se. The logic
is the same, however, with the replacement of elation with fear. All
illustrations of lightning are illustrated with forked ends, emphasizing
both the dual nature of the clowns as well as their reception among
non-clowns. Here, again, we have the shock or clash of opposites-as
illustrated by both Koestler (Fig. 3) and the Lakota (Fig. 2)--{;oming
from a single source.
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tmgic

Figure 3. Model of the Tragic vs. Comedic Experience
(Koestler 1967: 34)
Koestler compares the experience of witnessing a tragic
presentation with that of a comedic presentation. The emotional
buildup of the tragedy (and those that experience it) peaks smoothly
and concludes by tapering. The comedic moment, however, is a clear
bolt; the experience is explosive and concludes with reflexive laughter.
Once again, this explosion is a result from an unexpected turn (Fig. 2).
Another lieutenant or related entity of the Wakinyan is the
common bam swallow (Hirundo rustica).
As a means of
morphological comparison, the forked tail of the swallow parallels
quite well with the illustration of lightning.
However, simple
observation also reveals that the flight pattern of these small birds is as
erratic and zigzagged as the lightning bolt. Particularly when they are
feeding, swallows do not fly in a linear fashion, but take sudden, quick,
and seemingly aimless turns, unlike most avian species. According to
Lakota observations swallows make a significant presence before a
thunderstorm (Brown 1992: 45). This relationship/observation is also
established in Lakota cosmological stories. For instance, in George
Sword's telling of the story "A Myth of the Lakotas as It Is Told in
Their Winter Camps", a number of brothers are afraid to press forth on
their journey as they approach a range of mountains with an emerging
storm. A swallow informs them that he is the messenger of the
Wakinyan (Walker 1983: 81). It should be noted that the bat actually
seems not to be associated or directly related to the Wakinyan. The bat
is an aide to Yata, a blind giant that lives in the mountains. However, it
should be noted that Yata is described as "not wise and often does
things foolishly" by Red Rabbit (Walker 1983).
This reveals a clear relationship between both the form and
logic of humor and the Thunderbirds and swallows. Miller discusses
the "logic of proteanism" with his investigation of unpredictable
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behavior as an evolutionary adaptation: "Predictability is punished by
hostile animals capable of prediction. Instead of fleeing in a straight
line, rabbits tend to zigzag erratically-a protean escape behavior that
makes rabbits much harder to catch. Like the moth, the rabbit probably
evolved special brain mechanisms to randomize its escape path" (Miller
2000: 398). Compare this with Lame Deer's recollection of one
contrary who was being chased by some "cowboys on horseback". He
says that "they were trying to lasso him, but they never came close. He
was running in front of them, and sometimes he would turn
somersaults. Sometimes he would tum around and run backward, and
when they got near him he'd tum around once more and get away."
Lame Deer continues to note that the cowboys gave up, left, and the
heyoka turned out to be "an old man in his seventies ... An old whitehaired grandfather, but the thunder-beings had given him the power to
run fast."(Lame Deer & Erdoes 1972: 248)
A heyoka is seen as an impersonator of a form of a
"Supernatural" or "Mystery" in the pantheon of Lakota cosmology.
According to one source, the Wakinyan appears occasionally as
Heyoka, a "God" who is an "amiable giant." In one story, the
Thunderbird appears as this giant upon the swallow fulfilling the role of
being a clown. Once the swallow sees this, he is no longer required to
impersonate the deity (Walker 1991: 318, 221). Reverend Eugene
Buechel, a Jesuit who worked with and among the Lakota defined
heyoka as "the name of a Dakota god called by some the anti-natural
god. He is represented as a little old man with a cocked hat on his
head, a bow and arrows in his hands and quiver on his back. In winter
he goes naked, and in summer he wraps his buffalo robe around
himself' (Buechel 1970: 274). No other practitioner is required to
impersonate a "Mystery", yet the clowns are specifically required to
carry out their orders as a "Heyoka impersonator", or they suffer the
consequences. This, however, is not typical of only clowns, as "public
displays of ritual [or vision] were required before a man could control
the powers that had been given him" (DeMallie 1985: 88). White
animals in general represent a natural anomaly considering how rare
albinism and white coloring occur-particularly on the Plains. If
Heyoka is described as an "anti-natural god", the affiliation with
"unnaturally" colored animals makes perfect sense.
Here is another clear association between these relationships
with that of creativity in all of its forms. Koestler has three criteria of
the "humorist's technique" and the creative enterprise in general:
originality, emphasis, and implicitness (Koestler 1967: 333). The
relationship between humor and creativity should be quite clear; humor
is hinged on novelty or sudden violations of intuition and creativity is
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the progression from the extant to the novel. This is reflected in most
trickster literature, and Lakota stories are no exception.
In Walker's account of the Lakota creation story, "Inyan [the
stone] has two offspring. The older was brought forth full-grown from
an egg in an antinatural manner by Wakinyan. His name was Ksa and
he was the God of wisdom but he become [sic] the imp of mischief and
his name is Iktomi". The second offspring, interestingly enough, is Iya
"who is utterly evil and the chief of all evil beings" (Walker 1991: 51).
Iktomi the Spider-man is described as being "the size of an ordinary
man. His body was big and round like a bug. His legs and arms were
slim like a bug's" (1991: 101). Other accounts claim that "Spiders
were made from the blood of ancient people who died in a great flood.
Ikto can be powerless, a nobody, lower than a worm. But he can also
be a creator, more cunning than humans ... He can transform himself.
He is a mischief maker. He is good and bad at the same time-quick
thinking, taking advantage of every opportunity" (Erdoes & Ortiz 1998:
xv). Recall Miller's definition of "proteanism"-lktomi reflects
unpredictability and shape shifting.
Iktomi is attributed with creating language and giving names
to people and animals as well as arrowheads and war clubs (Brown
1992: 47; Walker 1991: 106). Old Horse recalls that "Iktomi is heyoka
for he talks with the Thunderbird. He will not play his tricks on the
heyoka" (1991: 129). Among the many Iktomi trickster tales, there are
three main qualities that are fundamental to him and trickster figures in
general: voracious sexual and nutritional hunger, and pulling pranks on
others. Here, lktomi's sexual exploits (i.e. constantly trying to
"create") relate quite nicely, once again, to the relationship between
creativity and humor as illustrated by Koestler. Pranks require baiting
others (much like a punch line) to behave in some way in order to trick
them (violation of intuitions). Lewis Hyde notes:
Trickster is a boundary-crosser. Every group has its edge, its sense of
in and out, and trickster is always there ... We constantly distinguishright and wrong, sacred and profane, clean and dirty, male and female,
young and old, living and dead-and in every case trickster will cross
the line and confuse the distinction. Trickster is the creative idiot,
therefore, the wise fool, the gray-haired baby, the cross-dresser, the
speaker of sacred profanities (Hyde 1998: 7).
Hyde also brings up an interesting fact which parallels both the role of
the heyoka and the sacred clown himself: namely, the trickster
transcends morality.
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He notes, "When someone's sense of honorable behavior has
left him unable to act, trickster will appear to suggest an amoral action,
something right/wrong that will get life going again. Trickster is the
mythic embodiment of ambiguity and ambivalence, doubleness and
duplicity, contradiction of paradox" (1998: 7). It would not be
unreasonable to see the "amorality" and the trickster's transcendence of
the good/bad dichotomy contained within the illustration of lightning.
Moreover, lktomi's fundamental conflict-being perpetually "hungry",
yet being responsible for the creative experience-is clear within the
Wakinyan model. Here, the oft-quoted statement of Black Elk offers
even more significance: "when a vision comes from the thunder
beings .. .it comes with terror like a thunder storm; but when the vision
has passed, the world is greener and happier; for wherever the truth of
vision comes upon the world, it is like a rain. The world, you see, is
happier after the terror of the storm" (Neihardt 2000: 145). This is also
reflected in Lakota thought as Iktomi is responsible for bringing death
to the world in order to make room for more creation (Brown 1992:
48).
Anthropologist Victor Turner (1995) states that "nothing
underlines regularity so well as absurdity or paradox ... nothing satisfies
as much as extravagant or temporarily permitted illicit behavior" (176).
In the liminal state, in which the clowns clearly are, he or she functions
as a preserver of the rites and ceremonies through his absurd acts and
interference. Turner states that "liminal entities ... are betwixt and
between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom,
convention, and ceremonial" (1995: 99). Moreover, "if liminality is
regarded as a time and place of withdrawal from normal modes of
social action, it can be seen as potentially a period of scrutinization of
central values and axioms of the culture in which it occurs" (1995:
167). Obviously, the contraries are indeed in a state of "withdrawal
from normal modes of social action", whereas the times spent
"scrutinizing" is enacted in the form of outright dissidence. Here is
where the fundamental contradictory nature of the clown reveals itself.
The heyoka, being under the influence of the Wakinyan have
clear associations with the pipe and what it represents. When used in a
ceremonial manner, the pipe is meant to uphold and maintain the truth.
Black Elk states that when "you are about to put this pipe to your
mouth, you should tell us nothing but the truth. The pipe is wakan
[sacred] and knows all things; you cannot fool it." He also states that
the Wakinyan "guards the pipe." By extension, then, the clowns,
through their opposite nature, reinforce and uphold truth by consciously
doing and saying exactly the opposite. The connection between the
Thunderbirds and Truth is also embedded in a statement made when
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what one says is challenged or a promise is made: "Na ecel lila
Wakinyan agli-wakinyan namahon" (Lame Deer & Erdoes 1972:
241).2
Lakota thought clearly reflects an observed relationship with
the internal (mental) and external environments. While lightning may
occur "out there" it also, in a sense, occurs within. The relationships
between features of the internal (mental and social) environment such
as wisdom, truth, and mischief and protean behavior are reflections of
features of the external environment as seen in storms, swallows,
spiders, and other anomalies.
Toward a Computational Account of Humor
There have been very impressive recent attempts to
understand the computational (i.e. on a computer) recognition of
particular humorous statements (Taylor 2004). One of the most
remarkable things, however, about human processes of humor is that it
is a cognitive reflex ("objective") but requires the constraints of the
sense of humor (SoH) in order to trigger the reflex ("subjective"). How
can we account for a universal, deep-rooted cognitive reflex and the
individually differentiated, schematic/surface differences? One of the
merits of the modular theory of mind is the fact that it bridges the ageold divide between biology (universal) and learned information
(individual). According to modularity theory, the mindlbrain can be
divided conceptually into various functions or faculties. Fodor (1983)
thus defines "faculty psychology" as the "view that many
fundamentally different kinds of psychological mechanisms must be
postulated in order to explain the facts of mental life" (1). In other
words, there are a number of innate, cognitive mental mechanisms that
are responsible for particular types of information (rather than all or
many types of information) processing or domain-specific (Hirschfeld
& Gelman 1994). The remaining discussion in this essay focuses
specifically on mental functions, not the brain as a biological structure.
Regardless, when discussing mental activity or faculties, we can
assume safely, as does Chomsky, that all things mental "ultimately lead
to the brain", hence the term "mind/brain" (Chomsky 1980: 5).
Fodor (1998) renders a faculty to be modular if it has four
distinct criteria: encapsulation, inaccessibility, domain specificity, and
innateness (127-128). Encapsulation, or "informational encapsulation"
is the idea that modules have hardwired information within them,
which informs perception and that they cannot be altered by outside
information (127). In other words, the limits of whether or not these
"mental organs" can work in tandem is regulated by other features of
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the mindlbrain rather than conscious effort. "Inaccessibility" refers to
the idea that while incoming information cannot alter the state of or the
information contained within the target module (encapsulation) itself,
the target module cannot inform outside information-in other words,
"it is supposed not to be available for the subject's voluntary report"
(127).
Clearly there is an innate component to humor and laughter
(see Gervais & Wilson in press for a thorough evolutionary discussion
of humor and laughter). Children learn to laugh and find things funny
on their own; they do not need to be trained to experience humor (quite
the opposite, actually). The fact that laughter is reflexive indicates that
something is informing us that the incoming stimulus is funny, but it
has to successfully pass through our "sense of humor" (Fig. 4). Some
of us enjoy dark, visceral humor whereas others find such humor
always inappropriate. There are many interesting developmental
questions regarding the precise types or nature of a particular sense of
humor, but such an investigation is beyond the scope of this essay.
Nevertheless, whatever mechanism that causes laughter must be
informed, somehow, by both the constraints of the sense of humor and
the mechanism (if indeed one exists) that codes incoming information
has "funny".

Learned

Joke, Components
OfJoke, Inferences

Sense of Humor

Innate

Mechanism That
Causes Laughter
Figure 4. The Relationship
between Learned and Innate Information

Tooby and Cosmides investigate the main theoretical
difference between behaviorist and nativist/innatist approaches to the
mind. They distinguish between what they call the Standard Social
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Science Model (SSSM) and the Integrated Causal Model (lCM). The
SSSM is "The consensus view of the nature of social and cultural
phenomena that has served for a century as the intellectual framework
for the organization of psychology and the social sciences and the
intellectual justification for their claims of autonomy from the rest of
science" (Cosmides & Tooby 1992). Because of this century-long
stagnation of development, "the central concept in psychology [has
been] learning", rather than innateness or the interaction between
nature and nurture.
In other words, the assumption that most behavior is learned,
rather than an expression of genetically endowed faculties. And such
learning, according to the SSSM, must be "equipotential, content-free,
content-independent,
general-purpose,
domain-general. .. these
mechanisms [of learning] must be constructed in such a way that they
can absorb any kind of cultural message or environmental input equally
well" (Cosmides & Tooby 1992). The ICM, on the other hand,
attempts to locate specific qualities of the mind, their function(s), and
under what conditions are they optimal. Quite likely, one's sense (or
frame) of humor is partially learned or culturally inherited, but the
relationship to the biological basis of humor and the learned sense of
humor-and the appropriate stimuli---ought to be clearer.
While specific surface-features of humor-inducing information
may be "culturally" specific (e.g.':horny spiders"), the laughing reflex
is most certainly genetically determined. It seems that such a
mechanism automatically distinguishes between vanetIes of
representations; we do not laugh a just anything. The SoH, I argue,
"checks" incoming information in the following grossly general
categories: a) intuitive or extant and b) counterintuitive or novel (Fig.
3). Consider the following examples:
1) A man walked down the street and considered buying flowers for
his wife.
2) A flower walked down the street and considered buying humans for
his wife.
The first is perfectly normal in our society whereas the latter, as far
as most can tell, is not. One does not need to be told/taught that
flowers do not do such things, but one needs to learn the symbolic
gesture of gifting a flower. The knowledge of the fact that people in
our culture attribute the gifting of plants with colorful petals as some
sign of affection is required to "get" the humor of the joke which is
crafted from a reversal of the relationship between man and flowers.
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One could conceivably find the idea of a flower walking down the
street as humorous as well, but for other reasons (Purzycki 2006). This
reversal constitutes Koestler's "bisociative shock" as two frames of
reference clash in unexpected ways. However, it is a violation of
intuitions because there is a breach of the ongoing process of accessing
related material. "A flower walked down the street" may stimulate a
number of expected outcomes, but the process of accessing all we
know about flowers, walking, and streets entails branching out
(intuiting) to particular features we associate with each of these. It is
only the moment of "buying humans for his wife" does this access the
appropriate association of flowers and the kind gesture of buying them
for a loved one. The reversal is the "shock to the inferential system",
and thusly produces laughter.

Intuitive

Novelty

Code (+)

Code (-)

Figure 5. Skeletal Model of Coding
Figure 5 is a skeletal model of how incoming information is coded
computationally.
The crucial component here is the "novelty"
determination. The very nature of the novelty, however, determines
what actually follows (e.g. stored better in the memory, triggering of
laughter or disgust, etc.). Let us look at another example to illustrate
the point: suppose someone were to tell you to "Go Foucault yourself'.
Now, there are a number of ways one can take this, given the
conditions provided by you, the reader. But keep in mind your mental
reflexes. In order to fully "get the joke", a rudimentary understanding
of who Foucault is (or those who claim some intellectual allegiance
with him), post-modem is/claims to be, and what this sort of work
consists of, etc. is imperative. However, if one does in fact know/think
they know what post-modernism is and as a reflex, rendered the
statement inappropriate or felt as though their personal intellectual
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paradigm has been affronted, then "humorous" is not quite an accurate
term to describe the experience.
When we are confronted with something novel-we do not
actively reflect on everything we've experienced in order to
consciously determine whether or not something is new. Rather, we
immediately react as though the stimulus is-and we are capable of
acknowledging its novelty. This trigger explains why, for instance, a
joke is no longer humorous once it has already been told; the noveltydetection system renders the stimulus "extant". In the "post-modem"
joke, you immediately knew whether or not you've heard the joke
before (but it may have sounded like something you've heard before,
which makes it funny), which is yet another interesting facet of the
humorous experience; our deep-rooted reflexes become quite
accustomed to repeated jokes. Old jokes lose their novelty after a
telling or two as the joke becomes integrated into the "intuitive".
Again, while it may be argued that it is ultimately subjective,
there are decidedly objective components to humor, its use, and
judgment as previously examined. Schematic or surface (learned)
differences comprise the basis for judgment between individuals: what
one finds funny, another may find intolerable and/or morally
corrupt/objectionable. The primary components, as discussed above,
are a humorous idea's novelty or violation of intuitions and the
automatic coding of "positive". Statements judged intolerable arguably
contain the same element, they are simply coded negatively (and
elaborated with conscious judgments such as "inappropriate" or
"immoral"). Again, the fact that we do not have to recall everything we
have previously experienced to know whether something is
novel/funny/unacceptable--it is an automatic judgment made by the
SoH is an important feature. The detection device requires access to
previously internalized information and experience. If a novelty
triggers the jolt of humor and is coded positively, we laugh. Koestler
notes that "Humor is the only domain of creative activity where a
stimulus on a high level of complexity produces a massive and sharply
defined response on the level ofphysiological reflexes" (31). Laughter
arises as an automatic reflex of computing incoming stimuli as "funny".
However, the immediate reaction requires some access to previously
acquired information as well as the immediate identification of the
stimulus as novel.
It accesses the schematic information we accumulate,
evaluates the data according to that previously acquired information
and produces a reactionary judgment. It goes without saying that we
rarely have to intellectually decide whether or not something is
funny-it is a knee-jerk reaction.
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Conclusion

The key elements of humor-violation of intuitions, positive
reactions, and the cultural stimulation required-provide enough to
further develop a computational theory of humor. As the crosscultural, unified understanding of humor and its related phenomena
such as creativity and novelty provide an important starting point,
further elaboration of a computational account of humor is rendered
easier.
Footnotes
1 The first part translates: "The music for the ceremony is either vague
or unharmonic. One can characterize it as 'reverse music'." The
second part translates: "A quiet drumming is attained, while they hit a
skin [or drumless drumhead] spread out on the ground with sticks."

This translates roughly as "Thus the winged, and as it really is,
thunder comes back-Thunder hears me." This is more or less the
English equivalent of "If I am lying, may God strike me down [with a
bolt oflightning]".

2
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